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ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
The development of proficient Joint Staffs at the Joint Task Force level is receiving increased
emphasis. One of the primary training tools available is the use of computer aided exercises. In
utilizing these devices for training Joint Task Force Staffs, many observations can be made over the
course of the exercise which aid in assessing readiness. The primary document used to focus the
training and assessment effort is the Universal Joint Task List. The list provides both the staff and
evaluators with a common document outlining critical events and activities which require successful
accomplishment. The document is organized in a manner which defines activities associated with the
many functional areas of staff activity including logistics, intelligence, force protection, and operational
firepower planning.
It is the purpose of this thesis to provide a methodology for objectively assessing the staffs
ability to conduct operational maneuver. Experimental runs using the Joint Theater Level Simulation
demonstrate how critical events and command control decisions affect the tempo of battle and produce
data elements which are useful in developing measures of performance for operational maneuver.
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The development of proficient Joint Staffs at the Joint Task Force level is
receiving increased emphasis. One of the primary training tools available is the
use of computer aided exercises. In utilizing these devices for training Joint Task
Force Staffs, many observations can be made over the course of the exercise
which aid in assessing readiness. The primary document used to focus the
training and assessment effort is the Universal Joint Task List. The list provides
both the staff and evaluators with a common document outlining critical events
and activities which require successful accomplishment. The document is
organized in a manner which defines activities associated with the many
functional areas of staff activity including logistics, intelligence, force protection,
and operational firepower planning.
It is the purpose of this thesis to provide a methodology for objectively
assessing the staffs ability to conduct operational maneuver. Experimental runs
using the Joint Theater Level Simulation demonstrate how critical events and
command control decisions affect the tempo of battle and produce data elements
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Readiness at all levels of command in all services is the ultimate focus of
training. While the training effort has the necessary focus at the service levels,
the joint training process is still in its infancy. This thesis presents a
methodology for assisting the assessment of joint staff performance during a
Computer Aided Exercise (CAX) with respect to one of many battlefield
functional areas, Operational Maneuver.
For forces at the brigade and battalion level the Combat Training Centers
are equipped and manned at the highest level to insure a valuable training
experience. One of the most valuable products of a training rotation at one of
those locations is the After Action Review process. Immediate feedback is given
with respect to understood tasks which, given certain conditions, are to be
performed to a required standard. The units are provided with a wide range of
paper copy and multimedia documentation of unit performance. The critical
aspect of this information is that it assists in focusing the training effort. In the
years of a declining defense budget training time must be optimized to increase
readiness on those tasks identified as weaknesses.
The burden on readiness caused by the lack of continuity in joint staff
make-up is compounded by the fact that lessons learned from joint exercises are
not captured as efficiently as at lower levels. This results in a weakened
learning process from exercise to exercise. Currently, the primary method of
archiving observations is the use of the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System.
The observations are not always a measure of warfighting readiness, but rather a
measure of the administrative conduct of the exercise. To help focus the training
effort the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) was developed. This document aligns
with the task, condition and standard method of training, assessment and
retraining used at lower levels of command.
The primary method of training a joint staff is the use of a Computer
Aided Exercise (CAX). The primary role of the underlying computer simulation
is to present a decision environment to the staff that produces realistic, stochastic
results. Based on this simulated environment, staffs implement plans, monitor
the current situation, and further develop or alter plans as required by the
changing requirements.
The objective of this thesis is to develop an exercise analysis methodology
for evaluating joint staff performance of maneuver oriented UJTL tasks in a
CAX. Specific objectives are:
• Determine quantifiable measures of effectiveness (MOEs) designed to work
in conjunction with data manipulated by a futuristic computer simulation.
• Ensure the measures reflect the underlying doctrinal concepts of maneuver as
defined in joint and service training manuals.
• Test the measures of effectiveness using the Joint Theater Level Simulation
(JTLS). This includes the development of a potential post-exercise analysis
technique for data currently captured in standardized ASCII files.
The interested reader is referred to the Naval Postgraduate School
Technical Report entitled Evaluation of Functional Area Performance in Internal Look
96, for a practical application of these methodologies in analyzing a Central
Command exercise.
Utilizing these objectives, this thesis investigates the effects of maneuver
on the battlefield. The critical data elements involve parameters describing the
capability, or mass, of forces and their relative velocities. This provides for the
demonstration of some physical analogs to help describe the processes of
military momentum, force and pressure. These concepts help quantify the art of
war and assist in observing the second order effects of command and control
decisions and successes or failures in other battlefield functional areas. With the
quantifiable measures developed here, the after action review process will be
more objective and perhaps enhance the learning during and after a CAX.
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The operational level of war, the primary focus of evaluation in this
thesis, serves as a link between the tactical and strategic levels. The increased
emphasis on joint operations puts a higher premium on flawless execution at the
operational level than ever before. The difficulty in assessing operational
performance resides in the lack of definition of measurable operational tasks.
Data wealthy tactical battles provide useful information, but only if their results
are integrated to provide an overall operational measure. It is the goal of this
thesis to provide a methodology for extracting the appropriate data from a
computer aided exercise (CAX) in order to make maneuver warfare concepts
tangible and measurable at the operational level. This will assist the creation of
measures of effectiveness and performance for operational level staffs. The
results of a CAX will then be more readily available for historical trend analysis
and immediate feedback.
B. SUPPORTING EFFORTS
This thesis supports a research effort directed at providing measurable
feedback with respect to the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). The UJTL
identifies key mission requirements and is the yardstick by which the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can measure readiness. The overall use of the UJTL is
discussed further in Chapter II. The framework of the UJTL derives from the
United States Army Blueprint of the Battlefield, which divides all operations on
the battlefield into functional areas. This thesis is a step toward providing
measures for those UJTL tasks pertaining to the conduct of Operational
Maneuver. This work must be viewed, however, as a part of the whole effort of
evaluating the overall readiness of a Joint Staff. The work of other thesis
students will address functional areas regarding force protection, operational
firepower and short term logistics support of amphibious operations. Work has
already been completed which developed measures of performance for theater
logistics and intelligence tasks. The interested reader is referred to the Naval
Postgraduate School Technical Report entitled Evaluation of Functional Area
Performance in Internal Look 96, for a practical application of these methodologies
in analyzing a Central Command exercise.
Taken together, these theses represent the baseline for further efforts to
develop a standard evaluation methodology for Joint Staff performance. The
conduct of a CAX produces a realistic environment for the training of a Joint
Staff. The use of the standardized methods for evaluating data developed in
these papers will assist in quantifying the training readiness state of a Joint
Staff. The method of analysis described in these papers provides a technique for
developing a causal audit trail for success or failure by a Joint Staff being trained
in a CAX.
C. OVERVIEW
The next chapter will provide background information on the three key
vehicles for the development of this thesis: the UJTL, Operational Maneuver
concepts, and theater level computer aided simulations. First, the UJTL is
described as the medium by which battlefield events or tasks can be defined for
assessment. This description will focus on the use of the UJTL in training the
force. The utility of a common document for all Unified Commands is critical to
standardizing the overall process of preparing, assessing, and training all joint
forces.
The military concepts of Operational Maneuver are then discussed in
order to identify the key areas which cause a force to succeed or fail on the
battlefield in this particular functional area. In gaining an understanding of the
military theory, the difficulty of trying to quantitatively assess concepts such as
principles and tenets becomes apparent. Additionally, an attempt is made to
identify tangible measures of some of the more intangible aspects of the conduct
of war. While many battlefield functions are quite measurable, maneuver is the
end result of command and control and the human decision making process. To
that end, analysis will be conducted on maneuver characteristics tied to
command and control decisions. Finally, theater level simulations are described
as the tool which allows the capture of actual data to support the methodology.
In Chapter III, each of the vehicles for analysis mentioned above are
described in greater detail. The methodology is traced from the input provided
by the UJTL. The important concepts of maneuver, which can be likened to the
function to be analyzed, are described next. Finally, the output of data
provided by the Joint Level Theater Simulation (JTLS) is described. This is
summarized in a dendritic which links critical issues with the data required to
assess those issues.
First, the hierarchical structure of the UJTL is shown along with the
integrated link between the other functional areas being addressed in other
theses. This demonstrates the complementary aspect of this work in assessing
the overall readiness of a staff.
Secondly, the identification of measurable battlefield activities is
discussed, where maneuver aspects such as agility and initiative are given a
more calculable definition for assessment. From the identification of these
measurable activities the formulation of measures of performance is presented.
Finally, the JTLS database information and management of that information is
described to understand how the simulation executes maneuver. JTLS
representations contain the necessary variables to describe systems and states of
nature in the attack. However, the simulation itself does not represent the effects
of maneuver. These effects are a result of command and control decisions made
during the conduct of an interactive wargame. Therefore, an example is
introduced to demonstrate application of the methodology and its relation to
player decisions. Spreadsheet and Pascal implementations used for data
analysis are described to complete this discussion.
The conduct of experimental and actual JTLS runs is discussed in
Chapter IV. Background information is provided to describe how JTLS
algorithms accomplish the various maneuver tasks. The scenarios used in the
controlled runs and the resulting outputs for analysis are shown. Finally, trends
and issues are identified and conclusions as to the significance of the results are
offered. In Chapter V, recommendations are given in order to further the study
and advance this methodology to a more integrated measure involving all
functional areas being analyzed. Additionally, the possibility of using the
methods introduced here to induce maneuver effects into modeling is explored.

II. BACKGROUND
A. JOINT TRAINING PROCESS
The Universal Joint Task List, or UJTL, is being utilized by all unified
commands to assist in mission planning and ensures a common use of military
doctrinal language among all services. The document has been in development
for nearly two years with the most current version dated 15 May 1995. The
overall proponent for the UJTL is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with
responsibility residing with the J-7 Directorate. The J-7 staff expected the
completed version of the task list to be available for use in December of 1995, but
does not expect the list to be integrated into exercises until fiscal year 1998. The
major tasks to be evaluated at the strategic (both national and theater),







































Figure 1. Base structure of the UJTL (Source: JWFC Command Brief).

The Universal Joint Task List is an integral part of the overall process of
evaluating joint readiness. Figure 2 demonstrates the cyclic process used to
develop doctrine, determine training requirements, and assess the level of
training.
ACHIEVING READINESS
Figure 2. The Training and Readiness Loop (Source: JWFC Command Brief)
The cycle is modeled after the process introduced by Colonel John Boyd
of the United States Air Force for understanding the development of a potential
combat situation. The process, known as the Observation, Orientation, Decision,
and Action Loop, serves here to insure a link between observed capabilities and
requirements for a particular CINC and development of a training exercise
measuring that command's ability to fight and win.
A 1995 report by the General Accounting Office noted that on many
occasions the training goals currently set for the accomplishment of a joint

training exercise provided no real measure of capability or readiness [Ref. 1: p.
3:2]. Instead, success was measured by goals which only represented
participation and administrative execution of the exercise. Utilizing the tasks
from Figure 1, the process from Figure 2, and the measures introduced here, a
more useful analysis can be derived from computer aided exercises. This will
focus the orientation and direction part of the Boyd cycle and lead to a more
refined assessment of areas needing more emphasis and training in the
development of follow-on exercises.
The product of this thesis, in conjunction with the theses covering other
operational tasks, will assist in providing direct integration of UJTL standards
into the exercise. Also, these efforts will assist in facilitating rapid analysis of
the level of training of a Joint Staff.
B. GROUND MANEUVER
Battles are won by slaughter and manoeuvre. The greater the
general, the more he contributes in manoeuvre, the less he demands
in slaughter.
-Winston Churchill
Both Naval Doctrinal Publication 1 and Marine FMFM 1, Warfighting,
address two types of warfare: attrition and maneuver. The underlying theme of
attrition warfare is strength against strength in an attempt to destroy enemy
personnel and equipment. Maneuver warfare, on the other hand, focuses on
gaining a positional advantage or exploiting a tactical advantage. The positional
advantage is with respect to both time and space; that is, we generate a faster
operational tempo than that of the enemy to gain a temporal advantage. [Ref. 2:
58] Before going further it is critical to point out the similarities and differences
of tactical and operational maneuver. The interdependence of tactical fire and
maneuver is critical; one cannot take place without the other.
While that interdependence still exists at the operational level, maneuver
at this level is the movement that establishes the conditions to discharge combat
power. It is therefore feasible to measure maneuver with regard only to the
combat potential of the force conducting the maneuver rather than the actual
attrition it is presently causing. The preconditions for an attrition fight are set as
a result of the completion of successful maneuver. It is the goal here to
determine the effects of operational maneuver. This does not translate directly
to the effects of fire, but to the effects of deploying forces for gain, either in a
coming battle or by taking an objective for which the enemy does not or will not
fight.
The results of attrition warfare are quantifiable and obtainable and,
therefore, normally used when analyzing historical battles or computer
simulations. Data elements such as the relative loss of personnel and equipment
for friendly and enemy forces seem to be reasonable measures for determining
success on the battlefield. Developments in combat modeling over the last half
of the century have been directed towards the approach that, given a believable
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set of attrition rates, the outcome of an engagement can be anticipated. History
seems to demonstrate that the resolve of the defeated force was typically
destroyed by other causes, primarily maneuver. [Ref. 3] Care should be taken
in using these data, however, as attrition warfare is synonymous to "slaughter"
from the quote by Churchill. Attrition results that appear less than favorable
may therefore lead to false conclusions that a campaign was less than successful.
In light of what Churchill says, perhaps "poor" attrition warfare results are
actually countered by successful maneuver results. It is therefore necessary to
capture measures of performance that assess the attributes of maneuver warfare
to ensure that a well planned maneuver strategy is not assessed using easily
gathered, but inappropriate attrition data elements. Perhaps Robert Leonhard
says it best in his book, The Art of Maneuver :
Rather than always resorting to ex-pressing simulation results in
terms of kill rates and loss ratios, we should seek to paint a more
comprehensive picture of the factors that make up victory or defeat.
We should routinely think in terms of movement speeds, decision
points, intelligence, command and control, deception, suppression,
and morale. When we begin to speak in terms of these new
measures ofeffectiveness, we will begin to shape our design of the
future force into a more maneuver-oriented combat team. More
important, we will be aligning our simulations with battlefield
realities instead ofwith analytically useful fiction. [Ref. 4: p. 143]
The capstone Army manual, FM 100-5, Operations, makes no distinction
between attrition and maneuver warfare. Instead, the Army relies on doctrinal
terms to describe the characteristics of a successful operation. These terms are
the Tenets of Army Operations: agility, initiative, depth, synchronization, and
11

versatility. Each of these tenets will be briefly outlined with a general attempt
at quantifying certain aspects of each. For each aspect addressed, there are many
more characteristics that could be considered necessary; however, the discussion
will be limited to a few of the more measurable.
Agility and versatility measure the ability of a force to seize the initiative
quicker and transition faster on the battlefield than the enemy. This requires
both physical and mental agility. Efficient command and control will insure that
the right forces are moving at the right time to the right location. Making
operational use of the Boyd Loop described in Chapter I, this likens to breaking
the enemy's Boyd Loop at the decision point while simultaneously accelerating
your own decision process. This concept is demonstrated graphically below:
Breaking the OODA Loop
ENEMY FRIENDLY
GOAL: Cycle faster than the enemy and break into
his loop at the earliest phase possible/allowable
MEANS: Information Differential translated to a
Closure Differential or Firepower Differential
Figure 3. Effects of C2 on Closure Differential.
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To make this aspect of maneuver warfare easily measurable, one could
analyze the difference in time between transitions to new operations and the
time spent in particular mission postures. Furthermore, weigh the amount of
success achieved by analyzing the strength of the force during those transitions
and in each potential posture. Quantitatively, the time spent between
transitions could be viewed as a measure of agility, if rapid transitions equated
to victories on the battlefield. Conversely, rapid transitions could identify a
force that is always reacting to enemy actions. In either case the data are
relevant and should be made available for the decision maker to determine what
is an acceptable level of dynamic or static postures. This analysis can be used
when assessing the ability of a force to create the proper tempo without radical
changes in posture.
Initiative in the attack involves pressing the fight and maintaining the
position of advantage over the enemy. By concentrating strengths against
enemy vulnerabilities and maintaining the speed of the attack, an attacker can
maintain the initiative. The greater the number of available, uncommitted forces
a commander has at his disposal, the greater the opportunity to maintain the
initiative. To measure this aspect of maneuver, consider the number of enemy
forces a friendly force is engaging with the intent of suppression or
containment. If this has occurred with a minimal use of friendly forces, the
13
commander has maintained the initiative much more clearly than if he had
equaled the amount of forces his enemy committed to action.
Depth of the attack and synchronization both measure the ability of the
commander to bring the effects of fire and maneuver on the enemy throughout
the battlespace and require coordination of assets from , all services. These
aspects could be best described by the ability of a friendly force to maneuver at
great distances while taking few casualties and inflicting maximum damage to
the material, equipment, and command and control of the enemy. The overall
ability to close the battle at any time, from any distance, using any asset will be
measured by a closure differential which demonstrates the physical momentum,
acceleration and leverage of the attacking force.
Leonhard points out three critical goals of maneuver warfare: preemption,
dislocation, and disruption. [Ref. 4] These terms are extensions of the Tenets of
Army Operations and support the collection of very similar objective data in
analyzing maneuver warfare. In acting with more agility and initiative than the
enemy, a friendly commander can force the enemy to continuously transition his
forces from one mission to the next. In this way the friendly force is causing the
expenditure of excess energy and logistical support as the enemy attempts to
determine his best counter to friendly action. The underlying philosophy of
maneuver warfare is to shatter the enemy's desire to fight. By conducting
14
preemptive dominant maneuver and disrupting the enemy decision cycle with
rapid action, this goal can be achieved.
These doctrinal and somewhat intangible terms are the underpinnings of
the argument that maneuver warfare is an art and not a science, and therefore
not measurable when compared to attrition warfare. The operational level of
war, the primary focus of evaluation in this thesis, serves as a link between the
tactical and strategic levels. Tactical battles provide useful data, but only if their
results are integrated to provide an overall operational measure. The methods
described here will provide ways of extracting measurable quantities from a
computer aided exercise that make maneuver warfare concepts tangible.
C. SYNTHESIZING TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL RESULTS
Currently, Cubic Applications is working under government contract at
the Joint Warfighting Center to provide data analysis in support of the after
action review (AAR) process. Their data analysis involves capturing useful
data elements such as the number of systems available of a certain type or the
number of systems lost to a particular type of munitions. These types of results
are tactical in nature and quantify the end state of any number of battles or
engagements. According to FM 100-5, without operational art, war would be a
set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of
success or failure [Ref. 5: p. 6-2]. Similarly, without assessment of operational
15
level tasks, analysis will be only a set of disconnected measures of tactical
results.
In addition to Cubic' s data analysis processes, the Joint Universal Lessons
Learned System (JULLS) is currently utilized to capture and archive written
observations made during the conduct of a joint exercise. These observations
can be made at the operational level of war but currently have no quantitative
measures which support the findings and subjective comments. The goal, then,
is to synthesize the tactical results that Cubic and others are currently gathering
with a measure of operational aspects in order to assess performance at the
operational level and support written observations currently archived in the
JULLS.
D. JOINT THEATER LEVEL MODELING
One of the factors involved in the development of a computer aided
exercise is selection of the appropriate model. The selection of the model is often
driven by the objectives of the training exercise, since each model has its own
limitations on what can be represented. The two most common simulation
configurations in use today are the Confederation of Models, which joins
together the service specific simulation models, and the Joint Theater Level
Simulation. While there also exist many analytical models which require no
human interaction, these models can not capture the effects of human decision
processes which is at the core of maneuver warfare and command and control.
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The Confederation of Models is a structure which integrates the existing
service specific models through the use of a layer of software called Aggregate
Level Simulation Protocol (ALSP). ALSP interprets and delivers situational
updates and combat attrition results between models that use differing internal
techniques. One of the advantages of this configuration is the resolution
provided by the service specific models in simulating the particular capabilities
of the components and other supporting structures such as national intelligence
and global communications systems. There is some loss of clarity, however,
when the ALSP cannot infer the proper picture from conflicting data across all
component systems. Additionally, the two-sided nature of the service models
prevents the inclusion of coalition forces. Coalition warfare has become a
common characteristic of most joint operations and an integral part of analyzing
operational maneuver, especially considering the difficult command and control
structure.
The Joint Theater Level Simulation is an interactive multi-sided,
aggregated, low resolution model designed to simulate air, ground and sea
conflict in an area of operations of 2000 by 2000 square nautical miles. When
used to support analysis of operation plans, JTLS affords several advantages
over models that rely on attrition of units based on combat power within
specified movement corridors. The JTLS model provides better fidelity than
ALSP, allows introduction of the effects of maneuver warfare, allows dynamic
17
application of air and naval power, and provides functions to model special
operations. [Ref. 6: p I]. Additionally JTLS maintains documentation of how
functional areas interact throughout the game. The capability to capture useful
data from that documentation is critical to this analysis. Finally, JTLS has been
selected by NATO to serve as the standard for joint computer aided exercises,
making it the preferred model for the conduct of this analysis.
18
III. METHODOLOGY
A. DEVELOPMENT OF MEASURES
The conduct of operational level maneuver is dependent upon the
execution of movement and maneuver tasks at the other levels of war. Likewise,
the performance of operational maneuver will affect the results of movement
and maneuver at those other levels. This highlights the vertical linkage of tasks
within a functional area as shown in Figure 4. The aim or objective which places
a force at a particular level of war may result in subordinate aims or objectives
for a portion of that force, with tasks at a lower level of war. A theater of
operations commander, or regional Commander in Chief, operates most often at
the operational level of war by applying military power in a designated theater
of operations. The efforts at that level support the strategic objectives assigned
by a geographic combatant commander or the national command authority. [Ref.
7: pp. 2-3,4]
The interdependence of each battlefield functional area has been
emphasized. The horizontal linkage across the entirety of the UJTL is
represented in Figure 5, highlighting the most critical tasks from other functional
areas which affect the accomplishment of movement tasks in a Humanitarian
Relief mission. The effect of accomplishing these tasks manifests itself in the
successful accomplishment of maneuver. Dynamics Research Corporation




Figure 4. Vertical Linkage of Movement/Maneuver Tasks.
Mission Objectives
• Establish distribution system
• Maintain security
Transition relief effort to others
OPERATION TEMPLATE
Figure 5. Horizontal Linkage Demonstrated in a Humanitarian Assistance
Mission.
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successful accomplishment of all tasks in the UJTL. This effort was useful in
determining a starting point for this study.
The DRC has developed a software package called the Joint Training
Computerized Analysis Tool (JoinT-CAT). A Joint Staff can select the essential
tasks for training and readiness and input the desired performance level for any
number of measures associated with a task. These measures are effective for
identifying quantities which can be described in terms of the percentages of the
whole force conducting some activity. For movement and maneuver the
standards normally relate to the actual velocity of forces or the rate at which they
are deployed. The users manual for the JoinT-CAT software package defines
three distinct parts of a training standard: a criterion, a scale and a measure. An
example is shown below:
60 days to complete mobilization
(criterion) (scale) (measure)
The manual states that the criterion and scale establish minimum or
desired levels of performance. The measure is considered the basis for
describing varying levels of performance with respect to UJTL tasks. The
measure must be related directly to a task and there may be more than one
measure for any task. [Ref. 8: p. 40] In some instances there is reference to the
doctrinal concepts of the decisive point and surprise within the measures. The
difficulty arises in determining how to collect these data elements. The dendritic






Are operations being directed at enemy centers of gravity?
Issue
How well is Operational Maneuver
being controlled and conducted?
Are operations being conducted in depth?
How effective are show of force and demonstration
How effective are forced entry operations?
Are operations to seize, hold, and expand a lodgment
effective?
Measure of Performance
How well are forces being transitioned to and from battle formations?
Time between changes of mission posture
Is force in contact or not at each time interval?
Are joint forces appropriately postured for operational formations?
Flexibility of available forces (How many different enemy forces are influenced by die presence
or actions of a given friendly force?)
Is momentum being maintained (closure differential increasing) for attacking forces?
Is enemy momentum being disrupted (closure differential decreasing) for defending forces?
Are operations being directed at enemy centers of gravity?
Does any given enemy element have a significant number of friendly forces with
positive/ increasing closure differentials in relation to it?
Are enemy forces being attacked from unexpected directions?
Are operations being conducted in depth?
Are enemy forces being simultaneously engaged throughout the battlespace?
How effective are show of force and demonstration operations?
How many enemy force mission postures change due to friendly presence?
How effective are forced entry operations?
How rapidly does the density of forces change?
How rapidly does the closure differential change in areas of forced entry?
Are operations to seize, hold, and expand a lodgment effective?
What is the change in combat potential in the area of a forced entry with respect to time?
Data Requirements
For all units battalion and higher ( or lower if operating independently ):
Location
Intelligence (Current Knowledge situation)
Combat Power Orientation
Mission
Time since last mission posture change
In contact / not in contact
Current Supply tonnage
Figure 6. Dendritic for developing data requirements.
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The sub-issues in Figure 6 mirror the relationship between OP 1, Conduct
Operational Movement and Maneuver, and the associated supporting tasks.
This linkage is also similar to the structure of the Mission Training Plan
developed by United States Atlantic Command for the training and evaluation of
operational movement and maneuver planned by a JTF staff [Ref. 9: p. 5-IV-34].
It is useful to note that the overall recurring theme of all associated Measures of
Performance involve the spatial and temporal relationship between enemy and
friendly forces and the ability to transition the force.
B. MANEUVER CONCEPTS QUANTIFIED
In order to measure successful use of operational maneuver, some
method of quantifying the first order effects of operational art must be
determined. The key tradeoffs in operational art are forces, space, and time.
The rates at which the three components interact as a function of the echelon is
the key to understanding and representing operational art. [Ref. 10: p. 24] The
interaction of forces, space, and time to determine the effects of operational
maneuver conforms to certain simple laws of physics and thermodynamics. The
application of military mass at a point on the battlefield with a certain velocity is
a measure of the momentum, p, of the attack:
p = m*v (Eqnl)
where, Ttl = mass of the force: size and capability
V = velocity of the force.
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Similarly, military force, F, can be considered as the ability to apply that
same form of military mass at some rate of acceleration in the attack:
F = m • a (Eqn2).
Finally, the military pressure, p, exerted on an enemy force can be
defined as the ability to apply some level of force strength at a certain tempo,
over some defined area of influence in the battlespace [Ref. 11: p. 76]:
nRT
V (Eqn3)
where, ft = the number of forces affecting the enemy
jR= a measure of the lethality of the force
T= the tempo or relative velocities in the operation
v= the volume of battlespace influenced.
In order to utilize these physical relationships the simulation model must
either contain parameters which liken to those described or it must produce data
from which those parameters can be derived. The resulting parameters are then
representative of the three components of operational art discussed at the
beginning of this section. These parameters describe the forces and the spatial
and temporal aspects of the battlefield.
Forces themselves are always modeled explicitly by parameters which
identify their capability. Strength, lethality and survivability are all accounted
for in detail because of their necessity in determining Lanchesterian attrition
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outcomes. The space and time components, however, have no explicit
representation and must be derived based upon constantly changing locations of
forces on the battlefield over time. This representation must include more than
simply using the speed of any given combat system, or aggregation of systems.
Instead, it must be relational, taking into account the operational maneuver of
both friendly and enemy forces, as well as the descriptive characteristics of the
units over time.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF A RELATIONAL MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE
The need for a relational descriptive parameter leads to development of a
measure of performance that is called the Fractional Closure Rate, or FCR:
DISTANCE/, e{t - At) - DISTANCE/, e(t) /T, A x
FCR/.eit) = r — i ,Y/>,r (Eqn4)
MAX[DISTANCE/.e(t- At), DISTANCE/. e(t)\ y n
where f = a specified friendly maneuver element or target
e = a specified enemy maneuver element or target
t = time of capture of the data.
The numerator of the FCR is a representation of the closure distance
between two forces in some time interval, At, or more simply the approach
velocity of two forces. It can be calculated during post processing by applying
the Cartesian distance formula to position data collected at each force location
change or a uniform time interval. Dividing by the maximum of the current or
last distance between forces creates a measure which has the flexibility of
demonstrating negative change in relation to the closure. In this form,
withdrawing at a certain distance has a negative FCR of the same magnitude as
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an advance at the same distance. This is shown in the following example for a
chosen enemy and friendly force indicated by indices 1,1.
DISTANCEu(t -Al) = \0km I0 _ 8
DISTANCE^) = Zkm FCR]](t) = ~W = +° 2
And if the same two forces moved apart at the same distances,
DISTANCEi.it -At) = 8km 8-10
DISTANCED) = \0km > FC*u(0 * ~lu~
= ~° 2 '
The denominator also serves to normalize the contribution of great
closure distances when further removed from an enemy threat For example,
upon arriving into theater, a force may cover 500 kilometers in 24 hours but still
remain at a distance of 500 kilometers. The magnitude of this move is of no
great value if the distance to the enemy is still significant. Therefore, a force
which closes 50 kilometers and still has 50 kilometers between themselves and
the enemy has the same calculated FCR within the same 24 hour period, despite
the fact that this is a much shorter move. This normalization can be easily
justified by the tactical nature of the latter forces approach and the planning time
required.
Additionally, the derivative of the FCR can be written as spatial
acceleration:
CA „ dFCR ,. FCR(t + M)-FCR(t)
SAf,e (t)= = hm —H ^—^-yf,ej (Eqn5).
dt a/^o At
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The Fractional Closure Rate is developed only as a measure of performance
to be incorporated into a measure of effectiveness for maneuver. It does have
some stand-alone use as a measure of effectiveness of the ability of a force to
maintain a high operational tempo. This translates to a quantitative measure of
initiative and agility, using depth of attack as the data element. The closure of
one friendly attacking force on one enemy defending force is demonstrated by
the example in Figure 7. The illustration provides a graphical analysis of some
of the implications of a change in the FCR and the spatial acceleration.














































Closure by One Friendly on One Enemy
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Figure 7. Fractional Closure Rate Behavior.
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The illustration for the Fractional Closure Rate of one friendly force on
one enemy force is instructional in that it identifies trends in the interaction
between two forces. In light of the fact that the enemy has to be concerned with
any force closing on him, an illustration of the FCR of many friendly forces
versus one enemy is shown.
A simple linear combination of FCRs for all friendly forces may not be
the most feasible representation of the overall pressure being applied to the
enemy force. However, it does provide a view of the overall effects of more than
one positive, or negative, closure rate with respect to a targeted force (Figure 8).
Time F4 F6 TOTAL
u U.UU U o.uu U.UU o.ou u.uu u.ou
1 0.91 -0.5 -0.51 -0.34 0.84 0.58 0.97
2 -0.98 -0.4 0.80 0.34 0.92 0.92 1.60
3 -0.16 -0.3 0.34 0.11 -0.13 -0.05 -0.20
4 0.97 -0.2 0.31 0.22 0.98 0.60 2.88
5 0.73 41 0.68 -0.04 0.88 2.67
6 -0.71 -0.25 -0.25 0.30 -0.81 -1.71
7 -0.28 -0.86 -0.88 0.75 -0.41 -1.70
8 -0.12 0.3 -0.56 -0.17 0.60 0.59 0.64
9 0.23 0.3 -0.55 -0.66 -0.08 -0.58 -1.34
10 -0.88 0.1 0.17 0.30 0.28 0.25 0.22
„ 4 00
S. 3 00





























^2^-^" 3 4 5
Time
Figure 8. Aggregated Fractional Closure Rates on one Enemy Force.
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At this point it becomes apparent that the risk associated with any
individual force FCR must be valued as being proportional to the relative worth
or lethality of the force creating the closure. The most immediate questions to be
answered when faced with an approaching enemy concern its capability
(firepower), strength and time of arrival in the area of operations. The worth or
value of a force in JTLS is part of the initial database in the form of a tactical unit
prototype score, or TUP SCORE. Every unit is categorized with one of eighty-
four prototypes, each having an associated TUP SCORE. This score can be
developed using various techniques. For this effort the scores which exist within
JTLS will be utilized. The scores can be found at Appendix A.
Additionally, the FCR is affected by a number of other factors, all of
which were identified in the dendritic at Figure 6 as data requirements: supply
rate, intelligence picture, mission posture, strength, and whether or not that force
is or is not currently in contact. The intelligence and supply factors highlight the
horizontal linkage in the UJTL, whereby a causal audit trail may, in fact, point to
deficiencies in a separate functional area. Analysis here will focus on the
posture and strength data to determine the true effect of a closure rate with
respect to the force capability and mission.
To highlight these effects consider two friendly forces, A and B, with
identical FCRs in relation to one enemy force. One force, A, has recent
intelligence of the enemy situation while the other is moving blindly and
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battling light resistance. Additionally, force A has been recently resupplied and
is at 90 percent strength, while the force B is at 70 percent and awaiting
replenishment of ammunition. If each of these units was exhibiting the same
closure behavior on an enemy force, the worth of the force would be degraded
by its weakened, uninformed, and poorly supplied status. This in turn should
degrade the Force B FCR relative to the FCR for Force A. Therefore, this
measure of performance must be weighted accordingly.
D. DETERMINATION OF FIREPOWER SCORE
Each unit in JTLS is represented by various parameters in the database.
These numbers are defined before execution of the game and are used
throughout to determine the outcomes of unit actions from resupply to combat.
One of the more widely accepted methods for determining the value of a force in
relation to its capabilities as a member of the entire force is the Eigenvalue, or
Anti Potential -Potential Technique. One system type is selected as the baseline
and all other force values are determined mathematically as scaled values of the
baseline. Each weapon type is valued based upon its ability to attrit each of the
possible enemy systems it could face. This is a much more technical method of
assigning force lethality indices than JTLS requires to properly simulate
aggregated combat.
Within the JTLS database these scores, determined by a less rigorous
judgmental method, are stored within Tactical Unit Prototypes as Combat
30
System Scores (TUP CS SCORE). The scores are then used in calculating the
overall value of a unit by multiplying the TUP CS SCORE by the number of units
of that type. These aggregated scores will be used to represent the overall mass
of the forces when determining the effects of closure.
E. WEIGHTING THE FCR AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO BATTLEFIELD
PHYSICS
Utilizing the FCR as a measure of velocity, the physical analogs of the
battlefield can be rewritten in terms of this relational and spatial velocity and
acceleration to provide the physical measures for evaluating operational
maneuver. The TUP CS SCORE will be used to weight the FCR, thereby taking
into account the strength and worth of a force:
nif = f TUP CS SCOREi * VSYSTEMSi * % STRENGTH
where i represents each weapon system type (Eqn6),
and the measure of effectiveness is:
(MOE) = m/ FCRf, e, t (Eqn7).
The FCR can be considered a form of the derivative of the position vector, or a
velocity. By substitution into Equation 1, an MOE which assesses the Military
Momentum directed against an enemy force over time is:
p e = X m/ FCR/...t,Vt (Eqn8) .
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Similarly, the spatial acceleration can be substituted into Equation 2, or take the
derivative of Equation 6, and the resulting MOE is Military Force directed
against an enemy at any time:
^ dFCR/,e,tF < = L ™f •
-j] > V * (Eqn9).
Finally, the pressure exerted on an enemy force at a given time by any number
of friendly forces can be obtained by:
nY,mfFCRf,e(t)
P<0) =— — (EqnlO),
where,
fl = the number of forces with an area of influence affecting
the enemy and,
AI = the doctrinal area of influence of enemy force, e (km 2).
In order to accurately assess the MOE from Equation 7, a set of rules must
be applied to decrement or screen out the use of an irrelevant FCR. In situations
where the available intelligence or capability of the closing force is less than
ideal, the MOE must be weighted accordingly. For the purposes of analyzing
maneuver alone, the assumption of perfect intelligence will be made. Also, only
the effects of weighting the FCR by strength and TUP score will be investigated
to portray the MOE from Equation 7. This will be accomplished through the use
of screening criteria within a spreadsheet and Pascal formulations discussed in
32
the next chapter. The physical analogs in Equations 8, 9 and 10 are offered for
consideration and simply expand on the notion of a weighted FCR.
F. SPREADSHEET AND TURBO PASCAL DATA ANALYSIS
Rolands and Associates, the developer of JTLS, has created a number of
routines which continually update ASCII output files with critical data during
the conduct of a JTLS exercise. These files have been developed in conjunction
with the UJTL assessment effort and provide a variety of data describing
engagement results, resupply, and a number of other characteristics. The data
are chronological and serve to assist in the identification of changes in the
behavior of the data during critical events. Three post processor files were used
in support of assessing maneuver. The location, posture, and strength files were
all utilized in spreadsheet and Turbo Pascal® implementations to assess the
MOEs developed. Examples of the input files are in Appendix B. The files were
read into an Excel® spreadsheet and sorted by (1) Force Name and, (2) Time.
This allowed for simpler development of the input procedures in the Pascal
code. The Pascal program was written in order to create a Node-Arc
representation of all the chronological data. A graph using an adjacency list
was developed using the linked list structure shown in Figure 9. The graph
stores all pertinent time, posture, strength, and location data. This allows for
easy accessibility and analysis of any force at any time and its relationship to all
other units on the battlefield. The computer code is given in Appendix C.
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Figure 9. Node-Adjacency List Representation of Data.
The Pascal program first reads in the location, posture and strength of every
force at any given time to create the graph. The user then identifies a force of
interest for which to calculate Fractional Closure Rates from Equation 4. The
code accesses a procedure (based upon the Great Circle Distance routine used by
JTLS) to determine the distance to all forces from any chosen force over the
entire run time of the game. Generation of closure calculations with respect to a
specific force creates a dense graph which connects the location of that force to
all others on the battlefield over the entire run time of the simulation. The Pascal
code for closure calculation has an order of complexity, 0(nm), of
(Number of Units) X (Number of Moves by all Units). An input file of
approximately 1 megabyte generated nearly 10 megabytes of output in the
controlled experiment containing 200 units.
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The resulting outputs provide a listing of the distances, closure rates,
and spatial accelerations for that force in relation to all others from start to finish.
Additionally, the node adjacency list is output to a file which can be inspected to
determine any force location at any time and their strength and posture. A
sample of the adjacency list can be found at Appendix D. This program greatly
simplifies the calculations and allows for assessment of any combination of
forces closing on one force over time. The output files are then opened in Excel
to produce graphical representations similar to the one demonstrated in Section
C of this chapter. By multiplying the value of the TUP by the strength, and then
by the closure or spatial acceleration, the appropriate MOE from Equation 7 can
be analyzed. The proposed physical analogs could be investigated as well.
Listing the posture in the output file allows further assessment with
respect to critical events and the impacts of force posture on the rate of closure
between forces. The results obtained from the experimental runs and this




A. MANEUVER REPRESENTATION IN JTLS
The Joint Theater Level Simulation uses SIMSCRIPT to support the need
for a discrete time simulation. The advantage of the discrete time simulation is
the ability to model activities that have been identified as critical events. The
key processes of theater level, air land battle are most easily visualized as a
collection of discrete (key) events. These critical events (a) take time to occur
and (b) potentially change the state of the systems. [Ref. 6, 2.9-2.10] It is these
characteristics that are of interest in gathering the appropriate data for the
assessment of operational maneuver.
The ground functions which are explicitly modeled are numerous but can
be generally categorized as shown in Figure 10.
Attrition Movement & Mobility/Countermobility C2
Maneuver /Survivability
Direct Fire Movement Delay/Attrition from Force
Organization








Figure 10. Ground Functions Modeled in JTLS.
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These functions are executed by units which are modeled as entities
within the simulation. Each unit is modeled by the previously discussed Unit
Prototypes. These prototypes identify the equipment, capabilities, and supply
requirements of a unit. The unit can be ordered into various postures and
missions listed under movement and maneuver in Figure 10. Additionally, the
unit will change postures if pre-established attrition thresholds are reached.
Movement itself is determined by Dijkstra minimum time and distance
algorithms based upon destinations input by the player. [Ref. 6] Factors
affecting the movement include the terrain representation and the unit
characteristics. The characteristics are further affected by such factors as
strength, supply rate, maintenance, and ground combat. These causal relations
aid in validating the use of the Fractional Closure Rate methodology. The
closure rate is dependent on factors which occur as a result of other functional
areas, again highlighting the horizontal linkage of the UJTL. Additionally, the
FCR is an end result of command and control decisions and player perception.
These characteristics differ from the functional area characteristics in that they
are not explicitly modeled. Analysis of output data trends could provide
valuable insight as to the psychological impacts on strategy and decision making
in conducting maneuver warfare with a closing enemy.
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B. SCENARIO REQUIREMENTS
The scenarios were all set in the Southwest Asia theater of operations.
The standard scenario allowed for the buildup of American forces in the region
before any Iraqi incursion, typical of recent history. The variations were
developed to demonstrate changes in maneuver results and to establish
conditions for successful development of the measures of performance
identified in Figure 6. A number of configurations were developed for the
experimental runs of JTLS. These combinations are shown in Figure 11. Two
different starting scenarios were investigated. One provided for conditions
which represented sufficient time for force build up (Light). A variation
exhibited conditions of an enemy seizure of the strategic initiative, sufficiently
degrading the ability to build combat power quickly in theater (Heavy). The
second scenario resulted in long distances being covered to bring forces in
contact with the enemy. This provided for analysis of the ability or inability to
create a temporal advantage in less than ideal conditions.
Within each of the different starting scenarios, a run was conducted for
situations where each side gained the operational advantage with respect to
initiative. Certain key decisions were scripted to insure that one side or the
other was able to exploit an advantage to demonstrate the effect on the FCR and
its related measures of effectiveness.
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Heavy Scenario Light Scenario




Run #2 Run #4
Figure 11. Experimental Run Conditions
C THE HEAVY SCENARIO
The heavy scenario was established to demonstrate the difficulty in
generating combat power and establishing a temporal advantage. It is assumed
the situation could occur for any number of reasons. These reasons could relate
to the occupation of American assets in another region or the ability of an
aggressor nation to recognize the need to seize the initiative in the overall
strategic situation. The Iraqi forces in this scenario have attacked across the
border to Haftr-al -Batin in north central Saudi Arabia and to the Kuwaiti border
along the coast. The immediate objective was to seize the Trans-Arab pipeline
and control the flow of oil in northern Saudi Arabia. Force locations as
American forces begin to arrive in theater are shown in Figure 12.
The deployment sequence was formulated to allow for one brigade each
from the 101 st Airborne Division and 24 th Mechanized Infantry Division to arrive
without difficulty at a port city near the city of Dhahran. Because the database
already contained United Kingdom forces in the region, they were used to
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support Saudi Arabian forces in the vicinity of King Khalid Military City
(KKMC). Finally, the Iraqi advance along the coast stopped short of crossing
into Saudi Arabia, allowing the deployment of two Marine Expeditionary Units
into the area of Al-Khafji. Under the conditions of Iraqi strategic initiative, forces
attacked well in advance of any Allied presence in the region. This assisted in
capturing data relevant to analysis of operational level task OP 1.2.3,
Concentrate Forces in Theater of Operations, and set the stage for the conduct of
operational maneuver. Given these conditions, a run was conducted
demonstrating seizure of the operational initiative by each force side.




For the purposes of analysis, the Iraqi forces secure the operational
initiative by conducting preemptive air strikes on deploying United States
forces. Forces from the 2nd Brigade of the 24 th Mechanized Infantry Division
(2/24* Mech) are given the mission to move west and support the defense of
KKMC. The Iraqi air and ground efforts are designed to impede that movement.
The progress of this movement is exhibited in Figure 13, with curve
behavior pointing to causal events which impede or facilitate that progress. The
actual data, shown by the yellow curve, exhibit a somewhat chaotic nature due
to the discrete state changes and the causal effects of critical events. While the
critical events are of interest, the erratic behavior overall distracts from the trend
being demonstrated. Smoothed estimations do not represent the main effects
being investigated since it is the discrete, extreme changes which help in
identifying key issues for establishing causal audit trails. Therefore, the
trendline, shown in black, utilizes every three data points to calculate a moving
average. The trendline is a more characteristic representation of the overall
trends in initiative and momentum. The actual data are also plotted in order to
clearly identify causal events.
A slow, but successful movement toward the objective area is
demonstrated by the gradual rise in the FCR from first movement at
approximately 0.5 decimal days in Figure 13. Movement is interdicted at 0.625
decimal days into the battle by Iraqi aircraft and delayed. Damage is simulated
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and the resulting time of repair induces further delays. This, in turn, produces a
drop in momentum until the completion of the first day. Additionally, the
initiation of the ground offensive by the Madinah Division creates movement
away from the 2/24 (M) static location, further decreasing the closure. As the
damage is repaired the closure ratio begins to increase rapidly for about 0.25
decimal days, or six hours. During this time the 2/24 (M) is able to close on
KKMC and the Madinah Division, and join the battle. The more pronounced
spatial acceleration, or slope of the FCR, is the result of the relational movement
of the two forces moving toward the same location at this point in the battle.
The Madinah movement was necessary to initiate ground combat with forces
already at KKMC, thereby maintaining the operational initiative.
As the Madinah Division begins to withdraw from contact at 1.15 days,
the FCR initially drops off before stabilizing back to the gradual rise exhibited in
the first few hours of the scenario. At this point in the battle the Madinah begins
to lose its momentum, and the unimpeded 2/24 (M) closes and joins battle at
approximately 1.5 days. For the next twelve hours, or 0.5 days, the American
force is able to create a favorable tempo, but has arrived well after the Iraqi force
was able to withdraw. Though creating a favorable FCR from 1.5 to 2.0 days, it
is occurring at the expense of pursuing an enemy with whom they still have not
gained contact. Finally, at the beginning of the second day, the Madinah
Division continues its withdrawal uninhibited by American efforts. The curve
characteristics at this point are useful to a CINC in evaluating the exercise. The
defeated Iraqi force is able to reduce the FCR. This translates to an inability to
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prevent a force from escaping the battle area. If this was intentional, then the
curve is simply an affirmation that the plan was properly conducted. If not, this
analysis portrays the inability of the 24th Mech to maintain the tempo and create
a favorable FCR with respect to the Iraqi forces.











(1) Iraqi Air Strike
(2) Unimpeded Iraqi
withdrawal
RESULT: Momentum Lost due to delay from
damaged equipment and lack of interdiction
Time (Decimal Days)
Figure 13. Effects of Interdiction on Closure.
The Madinah Division executes the withdrawal along with the
Hammurabi Division. The movement is from the KKMC area of operations to
support forces along the coast. Given the lateral movement of the Iraqi forces, a
successful counterattack plan would slow the withdrawal. This would prevent
employment of these divisions elsewhere in theater (OP 1.1.2 Conduct
Intratheater Redeployment and OP 1.2.3 Concentrate Forces in Theater). The
graph in Figure 14 demonstrates that, despite a withdrawal posture, the Iraqi
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Figure 14. Loss of Initiative in Battle Transition.
The zero slope nature of the graph from 1.2 days to 1.6 days translates to a
10 hour period of time during the Iraqi withdrawal during which the Allied
force did not maintain an aggressive pursuit. This type of information is
valuable in conducting post exercise analysis. Perhaps a force that was allowed
to escape in this manner reconstitutes and causes great damage later within the
theater. This was the intent of the controlled experiment; however, the modeled
Iraqi units were not capable of producing significant results against the forces
fighting along the coast. The Iraqi forces were still soundly defeated despite the
time for rearming and refitting granted by the lack of Allied pursuit. This
highlights one of the underlying themes of this thesis. Battlefield results cannot
be determined only by the initial attrition capability assessments. There is a lack
of flexibility in attrition assessment for an enemy force that, while not well
equipped, has gained the upper hand in the conduct of battle. This prohibits the




Using the same starting scenario as shown in Figure 12 and described in
the previous section, the simulation was re-scripted to include Allied command
and control decisions which demonstrated seizure of the operational initiative.
Despite the initial posture of Iraqi forces, this scenario allows American forces to
arrive in theater without interruption and fully deploy to defensive positions by
the close of day one of game time. Additionally, a lack of Iraqi offensive activity
allows for American air and ground attacks to initiate action against defending
Iraqi forces. The analysis which follows highlights the critical changes in curve
behavior based upon different command and control decisions.
The American plan was to advance the 2nd Brigade of the 24th (M) to the
same location in an attempt to build Allied combat power in that area. The
discussion of their successes and failures is identical to that of the Iraqi reserve.
Figure 15 demonstrates the FCR between each of these operational reserves for
each run as they approached the main battle area near KKMC.
The 17th Iraqi Armor Division was deep in Iraq in both runs of this
scenario. In each run the 17th advanced along the same route in an attempt to
join the battle near KKMC. Figure 15 demonstrates that when Iraq maintained
the operational initiative, the 17th Armor exhibited a positive closure rate on the
main battle area. The division exercised freedom of maneuver throughout the
run. The FCR was consistently positive and generally increasing. During




The Operational Maneuver analysis identifies that the 2/24th Mechanized
Infantry Brigade had difficulty maintaining the initiative and establishing
momentum. The identification of the causal, critical events found the enemy air
strike and the inability to slow the Iraqi force to be the prime contributors. It is
at this stage of analysis that the vertical linkage of tasks and the synthesis of all
theses assessing the UJTL becomes critical.
The need to identify the critical events and then establish a causal audit
trail throughout all functional areas prompts further discussion of the results
shown in Section C. A functional area analysis of Figure 13 would lead to
further causal discussions with respect to OP 6, Provide Operational Protection
,
OP 3, Employ Operational Firepower and OP 5, Employ Operational Command
and Control. Knowing that the Operational Maneuver was affected is not
sufficient. To be useful to a Unified Commander-in-Chief these results must
point to the "why's" of these effects.
Were there sufficient Air Defense assets with the moving force (OP 6.1.4
Counter Enemy Air Attack in Theater of Operations)? Was Operational
Firepower available to interdict the Iraqi withdrawal (OP 3.2.5.1 Conduct Air
Interdiction of Operational Forces) ? Did the staff properly plan for follow-on
operations (OP 5.4.4 Synchronize/ Integrate Operations)? The language for each
of these vertically linked tasks contains reference to many of the issues which
have been quantitatively captured or discussed here. The decisive point, combat
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potential, centers of gravity, momentum and the enemy commander's decision
cycle are all addressed in the Universal Joint Task List Manual. By capturing the
conduct of Operational Maneuver, the task of identifying a causal audit trail has
a well grounded start point.
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V. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. MOVEMENT VERSUS MANEUVER
It is critical to note how the measures introduced are intended to be
utilized. The subject under consideration is operational maneuver, and it may
seem that there is nothing valuable, or even comparable about movement. But
consider that while the operational commander has the force generation concern
of introducing forces in theater, the operational commander does not have the
same luxury. He must efficiently and aggressively employ the forces he has on
hand in many directions at many different times. Effective force generation
depends upon how well he can articulate his needs and how good his decision
cycle is so that he does not have forces moving in an untimely way to a place
where they are not needed. [Ref. 12]
The curves shown in Chapter IV are only worth analyzing if we are
looking at a force that was purposely moving toward, or away, from critical
nodes on the battlefield. The methodology introduced here allows for those
nodes to be identified as targets or forces and could be employed to help assess
closure on the overall center of gravity if identifiable.
B. FUTURE WORK
The methodology relies on the understanding that one cannot isolate the
effects of only one enemy force against one friendly force on a dynamic, non-
linear battlefield. Despite the ability of the Pascal implementation to generate
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the necessary data for the many interactions, further work should be done to
automate the graphical displays for after action review use. Within the massive
output files many forces may have exhibited interesting closure rates that were
overlooked.
A Master's Thesis entitled Direct Fire Synchronization utilizes spatio-
temporal displays and describes their impact on the cognitive processes of an
audience [Ref 14]. The data generated in this thesis would benefit from a similar
display which could show potential "hot spots7' of force closure. This expansion
could facilitate the further exploration of the physical analogies introduced in
Chapter HI.
C. THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT
The measures developed have application throughout the spectrum of
conflict from peace keeping operations to a major regional conflict. Consider the
purpose of disaster relief operations or noncombatant operations: gain control of
the situation by placing the proper assets in the proper place as quickly as
possible. The FCR method can identify if initiative is being maintained in those
operations as well as combat. The use of the FCR as a measure in those instances
could assist in refining decision making and resource allocation to insure
coverage of the most critical problems and rapid closure on completion of the
tasks at hand.
The relationships in the use of the FCR do not need to be bound to
friendly versus enemy. Though not demonstrated here, the measure could also
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point to command and control problems, logistical separation given a certain
mission posture, and the level of mutual support, or lack thereof, in the attack.
D. REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND SIMULATION RESULTS
The FCR has been described as demonstrating critical doctrinal concepts
such as agility and initiative. If the services believe in the mechanics which
underlie these concepts and battlefield effects, then perhaps simulations should
insure that the tempo of battle somehow degrades the attrition capability of
those who do not control it. In his foreword to the Richard Simpkin book, Race
to the Swift, General (Retired) Donn Starry answers his own rhetorical question,
"What does win?" by stating that in battles where force ratios were within
understood "standoff" limits, the majority of winners were those who seized the
initiative from the enemy and held it to battle's end. He goes on to state that
"Most often the initiative was successfully seized and held by maneuver" . [Ref.
13: p. 112]
As the information age and technology seem to run off into the future we
must not forget that it cannot leave its forces behind. Time is the new
dimension in warfare and, though smart bombs and long range strike will help
defeat that gap, our armed forces will always need to maintain the capability to
take ground. Information is outpacing the capability of the forces receiving it.
The revolution in military affairs, while in many ways suspended in the stars
via satellites, is only as good as the user on the ground and how well he uses it.
Perhaps the FCR can be a measure of effectiveness of information, command and
53
control, and maneuver all in one. To quote FM 100-5, Operations, "the ultimate
measure of command and control effectiveness is whether the force functions
more effectively and more quickly than the enemy [Ref. 13: p. 128]."
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APPENDIX A. TUP SCORES USED IN JTLS
The data in the following spreadsheet are taken from the On Line Players
Manual in JTLS. The number represents the overall firepower score for a unit
using any of the 84 prototypes. This score is not used in determining battle
outcome, but does impact on the capabilities and resupply of a unit These
scores are the values discussed in the development of military mass, m/ , and are







5 INFBN 1 2040
6 INFBN.3 1557







12 ADAJNF 1 754
13 DISCOMIN 1748
14 STC0 1 543
15 HHAVNBN 1 6134
16 HHAVNBN2 840
17 UHAVNBN 1 5379





21 NAVAIR 1 1330
22 MARAIR 1 1540
23 AFAIR 1 2833
24 AIRLIFT 1 2033
25 BOMTRAN 1233
26 AIRRGT2 6146




31 MXDIVHQ 1 868
32 ARDIVHQ1 1168
33 ABNDrVHQ 1 468
34 ASLTDVHQ 1 468
35 ABNBDEHQ 1 207
36 ASLTBDHQ 1 207
37 ARBDEHQ1 207
38 MXBDEHQ 1 207
















55 MLRS 1 3525
56 SF GP 1 370
57 AIRBASE 1 880
58 IQINFDIVARTY 4185
59 FABNTWD1 1593
60 AIRCAVSQ 1 6075
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APPENDIX B. SAMPLE INPUT FILES FROM POSTPROCESSOR
This information is representative of the input files received from Rolands
and Associates. The files were prepared for Pascal by opening them in a
spreadsheet and removing excess columns and characters. A sample from each
of the location, posture, and strength files is included. The input files ranged in
size between 3000 to 48000 bytes.
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Posture File, Heavy Run, Blue Initiative:
Game Time Side Unit Posture Mission
0.566758 1 D-3-7IN24 INACTIVE INACTIVE
0.584028 1 17ARDIV MOVING DEFEND
0.584028 1 17ARDIV MOVING MOVING
0.625694 1 101DISCOM MOVING DEFEND
0.625694 1 101DISCOM MOVING MOVING
0.625694 1 2BDE24MX MOVING DEFEND
0.625694 1 2BDE24MX MOVING MOVING
0.626383 1 389FS AIR OPNS DEFEND
0.626383 1 48FW AIR OPNS DEFEND
0.645774 1 1FW AIR OPNS DEFEND
0.645774 1 27FS AIR OPNS DEFEND
0.654172 1 1-41FABN MOVING MOVING
Location File:
Game Time Unit Type Unit Latitude Longitude Force Side
2.635056 2 VII-300004 30.84368 46.2272
2.635812 2 VII-300004 30.91667 46.16667
1.5 1 VIICORPS 27.49725 48.51149 1
1.5 1 VIIFA 27.48891 48.5088 1
1.8 1 XVI 1 1ABC 27.41667 48.26667 1
2 1 XVI 1 1FA 26.39403 50.05986 1
2.5592 3 ZSU-13 29.98023 47.34838
2.5592 3 ZSU-13 29.98023 47.34838
2.576049 3 ZSU-13 29.87511 47.30228
2.576049 3 ZSU-13 29.87511 47.30228
2.583366 3 ZSU-13 29.7712 47.30788
2.583366 3 ZSU-13 29.7712 47.30788
2.600228 3 ZSU-13 29.72952 47.43303
Strength File:
Game Time Unit Type Unit Strength
0.001 1 JFCMD.KU 99.43
0.001 1 KAHUINBDE 99.89
0.041667 1 KHARG.BTY 99.88
0.041667 1 KU.FORCES 99.83
0.041667 1 MADINAH 99.47
2.791689 1 MADINAH 95.13
2.833356 1 MADINAH 94.23
2.875023 1 MADINAH 83.46
2.91669 1 MADINAH 61.29
3 1 MADINAH 50.32
3.000024 1 MADINAH 39.68
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APPENDIX C. TURBO PASCAL CODE USED TO LINK DATA
AND CALCULATE CLOSURE
Documentation is in the comments within the code. The executable file is
not created to catch user errors. The Great Circle Distance used in JTLS was
used to determine the conversion factors included here. The code does not
execute calculation of the MOE, only the Fractional Closure Rate and Spatial
Acceleration. Further improvement could include the linking of TUP scores
within the code and calculation of the measures identified in Equations 7, 8 and
9. Even further improvement could include the use of a graphical overlay which
visually depicts the magnitudes of those measures using varying color intensities
on a screen shot from JTLS.
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program closuremaker;
Author - CPT Kevin Brown
July 1996
This main program calls grunit to execute a variety
purposes. Refer to the unit and thesis 'Evaluating Operational
Maneuver in a Computer Aided Exercise'.
The loops here in the main program allow for the creation
of data analysis for any number of JTLS runs, and any number
of forces within each of the runs.
uses wincrt, grunit;
var g : GraphType;
query 1,query2 : char;
begin
query l:='y';

















Author - CPT Kevin Brown
July 1996
This unit contains procedures used to consolidate data placed
in postprocessor files during a run of JTLS. A linked list is
created which allows for the user to analyze a variety of state
changes associated with:
(1) LOCATION (2) POSTURE
(3) STRENGTH (4) CLOSURE
The retrievable output consists of adjacency lists which are
indexed by unit and linked by time, and force relationship data
which are described in the thesis 'Evaluating Operational
in a Computer Aided Exercise'.
interface
const MAXUnitSIZE=250;





















procedure Location(var g: GraphType);
procedure Posture( var g: GraphType);
procedure Strength (var g: GraphType);
procedure MovesList ( var g: GraphType);
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procedure closurecalc (var g: GraphType);
implementation
{ Receives data from sterilized pplocation file. Modified file must have }
{ all extraneous columns removed; only Time, Lat,Long,Unit Name remain and }
{ in that order. Also must be sorted by Unit Name. }
r *AAAAAA*A*AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA*AAA* 'A AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA l
procedure Location(var g: GraphType);















with g do begin
NumberofUnits:=0;
while not SeekEof(InFile) do begin
readln(InFile/sTime,sLat/sLong/sName);
if sTimeoLast then begin {Do not rewrite same info}














CurrentA .Trme:=sTime; {Initialize all fields}
CurrentA . Lat: =sLat;
















{ Assign Postures from PPpost file }
l-tAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA'AAA)AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA»<AAAA A AAAAAAAAA'AA I
procedure Posture( var g: GraphType);
var i,index : integer;
Current : NodePOINT;
sTime : real;









writeln('Reading File.... 1 );
with g do begin
while not SeekEof(InFile) do begin
readln(InFile,sPosture,sTime,sName);
if sPostureO'INACTIVE 1 then begin {Not a valid posture}
index:=0;
for i:= 1 to NumberofUnits do begin




if index<>0 then begin {i.e. a unit has been found}
Current:=UnitNum[index].FirstMove;
while (Currentonil) do begin {assign current posture}
if (sTime<=CurrentA .Time) then begin {up to current time}
CurrentA .Posture:=sPosture;














Procedure to assign the appropriate Strength field entries to each node}
.HU^mumuuuuoumuuxjiujiAuoxxnumAJW
procedure Strength (var g: GraphType);












with g do begin
while not SeekEof(lnFile) do begin
readln(InFile,sTime,sStrength/sName);
if sStrength<100 then begin {only update if needed}
index: =0;
for i:= 1 to NumberofUnits do begin




if index<>0 then begin
Current:=UnitNum[index].FirstMove;
while (Currentonil) do begin












f AAAAAAAAAAAA*AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA*** ****** ***AAAAAAAAAAA A A A*A 1
{ Prints an adjacency list to a file which shows the movement of each}
{ force over time and its associated posture and strength }
f A A A A A A A A A AAA AAA A
A
-A AAA A AAAAAA A A A A A A A A AAA AAA A A AAA*AAAAAAAAAAAA A A AAA A A A A A A A A A A A A A 1
procedure MovesList ( var g: GraphType);













writeln(outfile/ ' Index Name Time Lat Long Posture Strength');
with g do begin
for i:= 1 to NumberofUnits do begin
with UnitNum[i] do begin
writeln(outfile/ i:3,' ',Name);
Current: =FirstMove;
while Current<>nil do begin




















r{ Internal Procedure to execute Distance algorithm provided by Rolands }
{ and Associates }
r** A *A AAAAAAAAAAAAAA A-A* <AA AAA*AAA*AAAAAA* -A<AA -AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 'AAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAA AAAAAAA l
procedure Distance (Name: string; EnemyMoves,FnendMoves: NodePOINT;
Flag: integer; var writeto: text);







if EnemyMovesA .Long=FriendMovesA .Long then begin





end; {End IF checking Same loc}
end
else begin













end; {End IF checking Same E/W loc}
Distance:=NautMiles*l .8522;







if Flag=l then begin










',Distance:5:3/ , /EnemyMovesA . Posture,' ',








{ Calculates the distance relation between all units and one selected }
{ unit and all others and writes to output file. }







writeln('Select the unit to be analyzed (by index - review adj list');
readln(j);
writeln;
writeln('Input Filename for Distance Data to include Path');







writeln(outfile,' Unit Time Distance EnPosture FrPosture FCR(t) SA(t)');
with g do begin
FriendMoves:=UnitNum[j].FirstMove;
LastFMove: =FriendMoves;
for i:=l to NumberofUnits do begin
if i<>j then begin
EnemyName:=UnitNum[i].Name;
EnemyMoves:=UnitNum[i].FirstMove;
while FriendMovesOnil do begin {for all friendly moves}
{and all enemy moves occuring}
{before each friendly move}





end;{End IF checking for valid times to calc dist}




end;{End While for Friendly Linked List}
{ if Friend is done moving and enemy is not, continue calc}
if (FnendMoves=nil) and (EnemyMovesOnil) then begin
while EnemyMovesOnil do begin





{reset pointer for next enemy}
end; {End exclusion of i=j
}
end; {End FOR loop }






APPENDIX D. UNIT MOVEMENT ADJACENCY LIST
The following spreadsheet extract is a sample of the adjacency list that is
created for every unit in the game after reading the inputs at APPENDIX B.
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Index Name Time Lat Long Posture Strength
1 1-10.ART
- 3.2 28.367 48.45 DEFEND 99.62
2 1-11FABN
- 2 26.4 50.05 DEFEND 99.62
3 1-12ARRG
- 2.125 27.009 49.251 MOVING 99.52
- 2.125 27.009 49.251 MOVING 99.52
- 2.131 27.1 49.187 MOVING 99.52
- 2.136 27.151 49.081 MOVING 99.52
- 2.142 27.044 49.085 MOVING 99.52
- 2.148 26.937 49.089 MOVING 99.52
- 2.153 26.83 49.093 MOVING 99.52
- 2.159 26.723 49.097 MOVING 99.52
- 2.165 26.616 49.101 MOVING 99.52
- 2.167 26.578 49.102 MOVING 99.52
- 2.172 26.629 48.996 MOVING 99.52
- 2.178 26.679 48.891 MOVING 99.52
- 2.184 26.786 48.887 MOVING 99.52
- 2.189 26.837 48.781 MOVING 99.52
- 2.195 26.887 48.675 MOVING 99.52
- 2.208 26.824 48.561 MOVING 99.52
- 2.214 26.717 48.565 MOVING 99.52
- 2.22 26.767 48.46 MOVING 99.52
- 2.225 26.763 48.34 MOVING 99.52
- 2.231 26.813 48.234 MOVING 99.52
- 2.237 26.865 48.124 MOVING 99.52
- 2.243 26.972 48.12 MOVING 99.52
- 2.248 27.022 48.014 MOVING 99.52
- 2.25 27.037 47.98 MOVING 99.52
- 2.257 27.09 47.868 MOVING 99.52
- 2.262 27.197 47.864 MOVING 99.52
- 2.268 27.304 47.859 MOVING 99.52
- 2.275 27.416 47.854 MOVING 99.52
- 2.285 27.478 47.721 MOVING 99.52
- 2.291 27.528 47.615 MOVING 99.52
- 2.292 27.521 47.603 MOVING 99.52
- 2.297 27.464 47.501 MOVING 99.52
- 2.306 27.388 47.366 MOVING 99.52
4 1-159AVB
- 1.5 27 49.25 DEFEND 99.93
- 2.008 27.091 49.187 MOVING 99.93
- 2.012 27.141 49.081 MOVING 99.93
- 2.021 27.29 49.075 MOVING 99.93
- 2.036 27.362 48.924 MOVING 99.93
- 2.042 27.445 48.921 MOVING 99.93
- 2.046 27.536 48.857 MOVING 99.93




- 0.001 27.68 45.659 DEFEND 99.51
25 10ARDIV
. - 2.548 30.027 47.622 MOVING 99.47
- . 2.554 29.922 47.626 MOVING 99.47
- - 2.559 29.816 47.631 MOVING 99.47
- - 2.566 29.704 47.637 MOVING 99.47
- - 2.573 29.592 47.642 MOVING 99.47
- - 2.583 29.495 47.646 MOVING 99.47
- - 2.599 29.344 47.653 MOVING 99.47
- - 2.625 29.223 47.811 DEFEND 99.47
- - 2.897 29.142 47.664 WITHDRAW 94.98
- - 2.905 29.08 47.551 WITHDRAW 94.98
- - 2.911 29.128 47.447 WITHDRAW 94.98
- - 2.917 29.145 47.446 WITHDRAW 95.05
- - 2.958 29.269 47.44 WITHDRAW 95.12
- - 2.977 29.35 47.587 WITHDRAW 95.12
- . 3 29.377 47.529 WITHDRAW 93.84
- - 3.042 29.426 47.422 WITHDRAW 93.86
- - 3.083 29.477 47.514 WITHDRAW 93.92
- - 3.125 29.626 47.507 WITHDRAW 93.96
- - 3.167 29.705 47.652 WITHDRAW 94.02
- - 3.208 29.824 47.647 WITHDRAW 94.07
- - 3.25 29.943 47.641 WITHDRAW 94.1
- - 3.256 30.049 47.636 WITHDRAW 94.1
- - 3.261 30.155 47.631 WITHDRAW 94.1
- - 3.278 30.225 47.476 WITHDRAW 94.1
- - 3.292 30.347 47.471 WITHDRAW 94.15
- - 3.298 30.389 47.51 WITHDRAW 94.15
26 10FABN
- - 0.001 27.677 46.506 DEFEND 99.55
27 11FABDE1
- - 2 26.408 50.072 DEFEND 99.89
28 11FABN
- - 0.001 28.177 47.85 DEFEND 99.55
29 12MAR.HQ
- - 3 28.367 48.45 DEFEND 99.89
30 12MOTINB
- - 0.001 28.476 48.129 DEFEND 99.56
31 13-LANCE
- - 0.014 26.443 50.045 None 100
32 13MEU.SO
- - 0.02 28.417 48.433 DEFEND 99.5
- - 2.5 28.433 48.433 ATTACK 99.5
- - 2.509 28.54 48.357 ATTACK 99.5
- - 2.533 28.654 48.293 ATTACK 99.5
33 14FABN
- - 0.001 28.457 48.13 DEFEND 99.62
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APPENDIX E. CLOSURE OUTPUT DATA
The following spreadsheet extract is a sample of the output generated by
the closure calculation unit. The example shown was generated using the Iraqi
17th Armored Division as the unit of interest during Run #2 closing on the 1st
British Armored Division near KKMC. The second set of tabular data represents
the Allied air strike. On inspection it can be determined that the aircraft was on
target at 0.6406 and 0.6856 decimal days.
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Unit Time Distance EnPosture FrPosture FCR(t) SA(t) En Strength
1ARDIV.U 0.6009 297.102 MOVING MOVING -0.054 0.017 99.46
1ARDIV.U 0.6178 283.256 MOVING MOVING 0.047 -0.101 99.46
1ARDIV.U 0.625 277.647 MOVING MOVING 0.02 0.027 99.46
1ARDIV.U 0.6565 264.301 MOVING MOVING 0.048 -0.028 99.46
1ARDIV.U 0.6667 257.039 MOVING MOVING 0.027 0.021 99.46
1ARDIV.U 0.7084 254.916 MOVING MOVING 0.008 0.019 99.46
1ARDIV.U 0.7683 242.342 MOVING MOVING 0.049 -0.041 99.46
1ARDIV.U 0.7866 226.25 MOVING MOVING 0.066 -0.017 99.46
1ARDIV.U 0.7917 221.812 MOVING MOVING 0.02 0.047 99.46
1ARDIV.U 0.81 205.871 MOVING MOVING 0.072 -0.052 99.46
1ARDIV.U 0.8334 198.873 MOVING MOVING 0.034 0.038 99.46
1ARDIV.U 0.8421 191.056 MOVING DEFEND 0.039 -0.005 99.46
1ARDIV.U 2.5 176.799 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.075 -0.035 99.48
1ARDIV.U 2.5417 163.495 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.075 -0.001 99.48
1ARDIV.U 2.5831 148.022 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.095 -0.019 99.48
1ARDIV.U 2.5834 147.942 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.001 0.094 99.48
1ARDIV.U 2.6248 132.842 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.102 -0.102 99.48
1ARDIV.U 2.625 132.768 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.001 0.102 99.48
1ARDIV.U 2.6667 121.554 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.084' -0.084 99.48
1ARDIV.U 2.7081 106.936 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.12 -0.036 99.48
1ARDIV.U 2.7084 106.829 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.001 0.119 99.48
1ARDIV.U 2.7497 93.011 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.129 -0.128 99.48
1ARDIV.U 2.75 92.908 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.001 0.128 99.48
1ARDIV.U 2.7914 80.305 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.136 -0.135 99.48
1ARDIV.U 2.7917 80.174 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.002 0.134 99.48
1ARDIV.U 2.833 63.894 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.203 -0.201 99.48
1ARDIV.U 2.8334 63.805 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.001 0.202 99.47
1ARDIV.U 2.8747 52.491 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.177 -0.176 99.47
1ARDIV.U 2.875 52.42 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.001 0.176 99.15
1ARDIV.U 2.8826 52.42 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.001 99.15
1ARDIV.U 2.8883 46.597 ATTACK WITHDRAW 0.111 -0.111 99.15
1ARDIV.U 2.8939 49.395 ATTACK WITHDRAW -0.057 0.168 99.15
1ARDIV.U 2.8996 59.004 ATTACK WITHDRAW -0.163 0.106 99.15
1ARDIV.U 2.9052 59.737 ATTACK WITHDRAW -0.012 -0.151 99.15
1ARDIV.U 2.9068 73.366 ATTACK WITHDRAW -0.186 0.173 99.15
1ARDIV.U 2.9108 73.366 ATTACK WITHDRAW -0.186 99.15
1ARDIV.U 2.9167 78.632 ATTACK WITHDRAW -0.067 0.067 99.15
1ARDIV.U 2.9343 90.489 ATTACK WITHDRAW -0.131 0.064 99.15
1ARDIV.U 2.9526 103.744 ATTACK WITHDRAW -0.128 -0.003 99.15
1ARDIV.U 2.9584 108.093 ATTACK WITHDRAW -0.04 -0.088 99.15
1ARDIV.U 2.9767 122.492 ATTACK WITHDRAW -0.118 0.077 99.15
1ARDIV.U 2.995 137.448 ATTACK WITHDRAW -0.109 -0.009 99.15
1ARDIV.U 3 141.673 ATTACK WITHDRAW -0.03 -0.079 99.15
1ARDIV.U 3.0183 157.104 ATTACK WITHDRAW -0.098 0.068 99.15
1ARDIV.U 3.0328 169.932 ATTACK WITHDRAW -0.075 -0.023 99.15
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Unit Time Distance EnPosture FrPosture FCR(t) SA(t) En Strength
17AR-280 0.6009 172.244 DEFEND MOVING 0.402 -0.445 99.53
17AR-280 0.6178 176.985 DEFEND MOVING -0.027 0.429 99.53
17AR-280 0.625 179.365 DEFEND MOVING -0.013 -0.014 99.53
17AR-280 0.6272 262.207 None MOVING -0.316 0.303 100
17AR-280 0.628 246.892 None MOVING 0.058 -0.374 100
17AR-280 0.6287 231.816 None MOVING 0.061 -0.003 100
17AR-280 0.6295 217.025 None MOVING 0.064 -0.003 100
17AR-280 0.6303 202.58 None MOVING 0.067 -0.003 100
17AR-280 0.6311 188.559 None MOVING 0.069 -0.003 100
17AR-280 0.6319 175.061 None MOVING 0.072 -0.002 100
1 7AR-280 0.6327 162.216 None MOVING 0.073 -0.002 100
17AR-280 0.6332 146.161 None MOVING 0.099 -0.026 100
17AR-280 0.634 133.767 None MOVING 0.085 0.014 100
17AR-280 0.6348 122.466 None MOVING 0.084 100
17AR-280 0.6354 105.81 None MOVING 0.136 -0.052 100
17AR-280 0.6362 95.707 None MOVING 0.095 0.041 100
17AR-280 0.6367 78.845 None MOVING 0.176 -0.081 100
17AR-280 0.6375 62 None MOVING 0.214 -0.037 100
17AR-280 0.6383 45.186 None MOVING 0.271 -0.058 100
1 7AR-280 0.6391 28.45 None MOVING 0.37 -0.099 100
17AR-280 0.6399 12.099 None MOVING 0.575 -0.204 100
17AR-280 0.6406 7.228 None MOVING 0.403 0.172 100
17AR-280 0.6414 22.945 None MOVING -0.685 1.088 100
17AR-280 0.6422 22.945 None MOVING -0.685 100
17AR-280 0.643 23.742 None MOVING -0.034 0.034 100
17AR-280 0.6438 34.204 None MOVING -0.306 0.272 100
17AR-280 0.6446 48.435 None MOVING -0.294 -0.012 100
17AR-280 0.6453 63.975 None MOVING -0.243 -0.051 100
17AR-280 0.6461 80.071 None MOVING -0.201 -0.042 100
17AR-280 0.6469 96.448 None MOVING -0.17 -0.031 100
17AR-280 0.6477 112.989 None MOVING -0.146 -0.023 100
17AR-280 0.6485 129.635 None MOVING -0.128 -0.018 100
17AR-280 0.649 136.443 None MOVING -0.05 -0.078 100
17AR-280 0.6498 153.356 None MOVING -0.11 0.06 100
17AR-280 0.6506 170.28 None MOVING -0.099 -0.011 100
17AR-280 0.6512 178.761 None MOVING -0.047 -0.052 100
17AR-280 0.652 195.7 None MOVING -0.087 0.039 100
17AR-280 0.6525 205.235 None MOVING -0.046 -0.04 100
17AR-280 0.6533 215.681 None MOVING -0.048 0.002 100
17AR-280 0.6541 226.913 None MOVING -0.05 0.001 100
17AR-280 0.6549 238.822 None MOVING -0.05 100
17AR-280 0.6557 251.312 None MOVING -0.05 100
17AR-280 0.6565 264.301 None MOVING -0.049 -0.001 100
17AR-280 0.6565 264.301 None MOVING -0.049 100
17AR-280 0.6573 268.112 None MOVING -0.014 0.014 100
17AR-280 0.6667 268.112 None MOVING -0.014 100
17AR-280 0.7084 265.895 None MOVING 0.008 -0.008 100
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Unit Time Distance EnPosture FrPosture FCR(t) SA(t) En Strength
17AR-280 0.8334 210.257 None MOVING 0.031 0.035 100
17AR-280 0.8421 202.73 None DEFEND 0.036 -0.004 100
17AR-280 2.8826 193.049 None WITHDRAW 0.048 -0.012 100
17AR-280 2.8883 183.623 None WITHDRAW 0.049 -0.001 100
17AR-280 2.8939 179.587 None WITHDRAW 0.022 0.027 100
17AR-280 2.8996 182.383 None WITHDRAW -0.015 0.037 100
17AR-280 2.9052 174.293 None WITHDRAW 0.044 -0.06 100
17AR-280 2.9108 178.361 None WITHDRAW -0.023 0.067 100
17AR-280 2.9167 182.815 None WITHDRAW -0.024 ,0.002 100
17AR-280 2.9343 199.594 None WITHDRAW -0.084 0.06 100
17AR-280 2.9526 216.382 None WITHDRAW -0.078 -0.006 100
17AR-280 2.9584 221.63 None WITHDRAW -0.024 -0.054 100
17AR-280 2.9767 238.424 None WITHDRAW -0.07 0.047 100
17AR-280 2.995 255.22 None WITHDRAW -0.066 -0.005 100
1 7AR-280 3 259.881 None WITHDRAW -0.018 -0.048 100
17AR-280 3.0183 276.676 None WITHDRAW -0.061 0.043 100
17AR-280 3.0328 286.467 None WITHDRAW -0.034 -0.027 100
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